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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A. E. UPTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
L. H. HEISELT, RAY HEISELT, V. 
M. SAMUELS, MRS. V. M. SAMU-
ELS, ELIZABETH BREEN, L. R. 
WATTIS COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, WATTIS SAMUELS COM-
PANY, a corporation, and HEISELT 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
corporation, and unknown heirs, 
Defendants, 
L. H. HEISELT and HEISELT CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Appellants. 
No. 7430 
BRIEF OF L. H. HEISEL T AND HEISEL T CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANl"S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a suit to quiet title to a group of platted lots in 
North Salt Lake. The Complaint is in the usual form, but 
in two counts. In the CCFirst Count" deeds are referred to as 
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Exhibits A to G inclusive and in the ((Second Count," adverse 
possesston is pleaded ««for about seven years prior thereto" 
(Tr. 1). 
L. H. Heiselt answered denying the validity of the tax 
deeds and alleging that if the title was in fact conveyed to the 
plaintiff, it was conveyed in trust and that the plaintiff held 
title for the use and benefit of th~ defendant. (Tr. 31). 
The defendant, Heiselt Construction Company, answered 
setting up the joint ownership of a part of the lots. Subse-
quently, the defendants, Heiselt Construction Company and 
L. H. Heiselt filed an Amendment and Supplement to their 
separate answers setting up the acquisition by deed of an interest 
in the lots claimed by the defendant, V. M. Samuels (Tr. 
37, 125). 
Demurrers were filed upon many grounds, and the Answer 
was amended in many respects, none of which it is thought 
have any bearing upon the issues presented to this court. 
The court quieted title to all of the property in the plain-
tiff as prayed (Tr. 149). 
Except as indicated all of the rematntng defendants in 
the case defaulted and the record shows none of them has 
any interest in the property. 
The record is long and numerous individuals and cor-
porations are referred to in the evidence. It will add to the 
clarity of the statement at the outset to make known to the 
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court the individuals and corporations referred to in the testi-
mony and exhibits. 
The plaintiff was and is a banker, President of the National 
City Bank of Denver. A. E. Peterson was a director of the 
bank and on the loan committee. L. H. Heiselt was a con-
tractor, who usually did business in the name of the lfeiselt 
Construction Company, a Utah corporation, not qualified to 
do business in Colorado. L. R. Wattis Company was a Utah 
Corporation which together with V. M. Samuels, L. H. Hetselt 
and Heiselt Construction Company owned the lots in Salt 
Lake City, title to which plaintiff sought to quiet in him. L. 
H. Heiselt, Inc., was a Colorado corporation. 
William J. Christensen was an employee of the defendants 
L. H. Heiselt and Heiselt Construction Company. He began 
work for them in May or June of 1936. He was paid on a 
monthly basis of $150.00, continued his employment on that 
basis until 1937, did work on a commission basis in 1938 and 
1939, and was given a Power of Attorney, 1941 or 1942 and 
during that time, 4e was associated with Ben Roberts in the 
filing of a suit for L. H. Heiselt, Inc., vs. Brown-Schrepferman 
(Tr. 375 and 376). 
In 1938 or 1939, he sold rails which wer~ on the lands 
described in the Complaint and took a ten per cent commission. 
While the facts in the case are involved, they readily lend 
themselves to analysis and statement if followed in a chrono-
logical order. 
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On May 4, 1936, an account was opened in the National 
City Bank in the name of L. H. Heiselt. Heiselt gave his 
personal note to the bank for $1,000.00 and was credited for 
that amount. On May 11th, A. E. Upton deposited $1,000.00 
in the account, and on May 18th, Peterson deposited another 
$1,000.00 in the account. Other deposits were subsequently 
made by Peterson and Upton in this account, and the :1ccount 
appears to have been changed to Heiselt Construction Company 
(Exhibit 9). 
On May 8th, L. H. Heiselt and A. E. Upton were in con-
ferences with L. R. W attis, who, at the time, apparently rep-
resented the L. R. W attis Company, Caldwell Construction 
and Wattis-Samuels Company. The conferences were had at 
the Newhouse Hotel, during which Upton went to the office 
of Ben E. Roberts in the Newhouse Building and dictated an 
Option agreement, (Exribit 3) which was signed by W attis 
for all the construction companies excepting the W attis-
Samuels Company. The Option covers the lots in controversy 
and all equipment upon the property. It also covered land 
in California. It was for the consideration of $5,000.00, the 
assumption of one-half of an indebtedness to the Continental 
National Bank and the property was to be free and clear of 
all liens and encumbrances ((except unpaid taxes and a trust 
deed covering the ranch," and ran to July 8. 
On July 4th, four days before the Option expired, Upton 
wrote a telegram addressed to L. R. Wattis and H. W. Dunri 
(Dunn having acquired an interest in the amount payable on 
the option), accepting the Option (Exhibit 18), and on July 
25, 1936, a check was drawn on the account shown by Exhibit 
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No. 9 for $100.00, payable to L. R. Wattis with a notation on 
the bottom, HTo apply on purchase under Option of May 8, 
1936," signed "L. H. Heiselt" with a notation on the upper 
left hand corner, "Upton 0. K." (Exhibit 15). 
On July 25, another check for $400.00 was issued against 
the same account with notation: "May 8th, Option Agreernent" 
(Exhibit 16). 
On September 15, 1936 (Exhibit 2) Upton wrote Ben 
E. Roberts saying: 
~~Mr. Heiselt wired Mr. Wattis a number of days 
prior to the expiration of the option requesting him 
to forward proper conveyances to this bank for im-
mediate payment and we are still without such con-
veyances. In the meantime Mr. Heiselt has paid Mr. 
Wattis $500.00 by check on July 25, 1936, and Mr. 
Wattis gave him his receipt reading, (To apply on pur-
chase as per option agreement under date of May 8, 
1936, between L. H. Heiselt, A. E. Upton and L. R. 
Wattis pending completion of conveyances.' As noted 
by the copy of letter to Mr. Dunn he is now sending 
an additional $1,000.00 as recited therein." 
On October 17th, the check referred to in the letter, for 
$1,000.00 was mailed (Exhibit 33). The check is signed \(The 
Heiselt Construction Company by L. I-I. Heiselt by A. E. ·u." 
On the 17th day of August, 1936, a Quit-Claim Deed 
(Exhibit 1) was signed and acknowledged. It was in the 
possession of the National City Bank on March 1, 1940, at 
which time the L. R. Wattis Company, Caldwell Construction 
Company, W. H. Dunn and L. R. Wattis, by Geo. C. Buckle, 
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their attorney, demanded the reconveyance of the land (Ex-
hibit 23). 
At the time the Option was given, May 8, 1936, Ben E. 
Roberts was employed to negotiate with Salt Lake County for 
the settlement of the taxes and was paid a fee of $300.00 (Ex-
hibit 34). On December 31, 1936, negotiations with the County 
Commissioners had resulted in an agreement to accept $1,225.00 
as full payment of the taxes (Exhibit 40). At the bottom of 
the exhibit, the court will observe instructions from M;. Roberts 
to the County Treasurer, to make the Tax Deed run to Upton. 
On December 18, 1936, A. E. Upton and L. H. Heiselt 
were in the office of Alder and Upton-the Upton of the law 
firm being the brother of plaintiff and his attorney. The 
plaintiff gave his brother a check for $1225.00, and the check 
was transmitted to Mr. Roberts with a letter (Exhibit 5) in 
which the writer said: 
((We herewith enclose check of A. E. Upton on The 
National City Bank of Denver payable to County 
Treasurer of Salt Lake County, Utah, for $1225.00, 
with instructions for Mr. Heiselt and Mr. Upton that 
it is to be used to secure tax deeds on certain properties 
known as W attis and Heiselt Storage Yards, about 
which property you have had correspondence, in the 
name of A. E. Upton." 
Upon payment of the check, Tax Deeds in accordance with in-
structions given by Mr. Roberts (Exhibits D, E, F and G) 
were issued. For the services rendered by Mr. Roberts, he 
was paid $200.00 by check dated September 1, 1937. The 
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check was drawn on L. H. Heiselt, Inc., by A. E. Upton (Ex-
hibit 11) ~ 
The court will observe that the Option Agreement was 
taken subject to the taxes. The payments on the Option were 
made out of the account opened in the National City Bank with 
the deposits referred to and the amount necessary to retire the 
taxes undr the Agrement was paid by Upton and the Tax Deed 
at the joint request of Heiselt and Upton was taken as directed 
in the letter from Alder and Upton (Exhibit 5). 
At the time the property was purchased from the County, 
the Quit-Claim Deed from the L. R. Wattis Company, as seller, 
to Heiselt, was executed and acknowledged. It was then being 
held by the National City Bank, (Tr. 293, 296), was under the 
control of Upton and was, in 1944 or 1945, delivered to 
Buckle by Upton or under his directions, who in turn gave 
it to McLaughlin, Referee in Bankruptcy at Denver, at which 
time the Referee paid out of the funds of L. H. Heiselt the 
balance due on the Option Agreement amounting to $1750.00 
(Tr. 298, 300). (See Exhibit 23, which is a receipt of $500.00 
issued by W. H. Dunn, by Geo. C. Buckle, his attorney in fact, 
attached to the notice at the foot of which, in handwriting, 
is a statement that the balance was $22 50.00 before the 
$500.00 was paid.) 
While the deed, (Exhibit 1) was out in the hands of the 
bank and while there was yet due on the contract $1750.00, 
the amount stated on June 10, 1941, Upton again paid the 
taxes on the property and procured the issuance to him of the 
tax deeds (Exhibits A, B and C). 
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On April 18, 1946, Heiselt was at the Bank and discussed 
with Upton the matter of making a complete settlement of 
all matters pertaining to the lots. It was after the deed (Ex-
hibit 1) had been delivered to the Referee for the additional 
payment of $1750.00. An agreement was made and Upton 
wrote William J. Christensen, his attorney in this case (Ex-
hibit 1 7) as follows: 
((Lawrence Heiselt has been here a couple of days 
negotiating with me and we have come to an under-
standing if the matter can be worked out. He will 
take it up with you upon his return to Salt Lake. 
~~In the meantime, this letter will authorize you to 
permit him to remove all personal property belongi_ng 
to him, or the Heiselt Construction Cnmpany, from 
the property without expense to me or to hin1 so far 
as I am concerned. 
((As soon as the contract of settlement is made up, 
Ernest's office or I will send it to Lawrence and he will 
consult with you about it. In the meantime, it will 
not be necessary for me to take up the other matters 
in your letter of April 9th. 
~~Trusting all is well with you, I remain 
Yours very truly, 
A. E. Upton." 
On the same day, Upton wrote another letter to Christensen 
as follows (Exhibit 38) : · 
~] neglected to tell you in my first letter today to 
cooperate with Ben Roberts in having the trial date 
of the foreclosure suit vacated in order that we may 
get the settlement contract completed. 
10 
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HE. B. is leaving on vacation the first of May and is 
working day and night to get unfinished items cleaned 
up so it was impossible for him to take the time to go 
over all of the papers necessary to make up the con-
tract for Lawrence and me. Harry King will take care 
of it but he is tied up in court cases until next Monday 
so we cannot begin on this matter before Tuesday or 
Wednesday following. 
Very truly yours, 
A. E. Upton." 
After the discussions and negotiations between these 
two men, Upton and Heiselt went to the office of Upton's 
brother, Ernest B. Upton and while the three were together, 
the terms of the settlement between Upton and Heiselt (Tr. 
3 57, 364) were discussed and notes of the settlement taken by 
Ernest B. Upton. 
The letters above referred to (Exhibits 17 and 38) and 
the notations of terms (Exribit 3 7) were_ offered in evidence. 
Exhibit 17 was received, but subsequently upon motion, was 
stricken upon the ground that it was evidence of a compromise 
(Tr. 326). Exhibits 37 and 38 were not received (Tr. 463, 464, 
465). 
During the conferences between Upton and Heiselt, they 
went to the office of Mr. McLaughlin, the Referee in Bank-
ruptcy, and discussed matters pertaining to the bankruptcy and 
requested the Referee to give them an opinion. The Referee 
did so in writing, which was offered in evidence as Exhibit 20. 
The offer was rejected. 
11 
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The Court will observe that by the Option, there was ex4 
cepted: 
''The interest formerly owned by the Wattis-Samuels 
Company and transferred to V. M. Samuels." 
On April27, 1937, Upton wrote Ben E. Roberts as follows 
(Exhibit 8) : 
"Mr. Heiselt settled with Mr. V. M. Samuels today 
for the amount owing him, namely $800.00, on the 
P and H Model 205 Shovel. Mr. Samules has conveyed 
the shovel to me and Mr. Heiselt sells to Mr. Samuels 
fifteen tons of steel rail from his Salt Lake yard and 
I am to convey to Mr. Samuels one-third interest in 
Lot 36, Block 2, Maack Addition and a one-fourth in-
terest in Lots 1 to 7, and 2 5 to 3 5, inclusive, in Block 
2, Maack Addition. The intent being to convey to Mr. 
Samuels the interest that he already owned as referred 
to in the original agreement between L. R. W attis 
and L. H. Heiselt. 
((Will you kindly make up the proper conveyances 
and forward same to Mr. Heiselt at Alamosa, Colorado, 
who will approve them and forvvard to me for execu-
tion. In turn I will forward them to Mr. Samuels at 
Cody, Wyoming. 
"Any obligations on the part of Mr. Samuels to you, 
in connection with this tax matter is being taken care 
of by Mr. Heiselt as a part hereof. 
((While I am writing you about this matter may I 
refer back to your letter of February 10, 1937, to know 
if I should return the certificate on Lot 36, Block 2, 
to you at this time and also ask you to follow up on 
12 
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the 1936 taxes as outlined in paragraph three of your 
letter. 
ttThanking you in advance for your continued co-
operation, I remain, 
Sincere! y yours, 
A. E. Upton.'' 
And on February 3, 1938 (Exhibit 7), he wrote him as follows: 
uMr. V. M. Samuels has written me asking that I 
communicate with you about the lots he claims in con-
nection with the Heiselt Construction C'Ompany prop-
erty. 
((Lawrence told me that you had advised him that 
Samuels had never had any interest in some of the lots 
he, Samuels, claimed. Lawrence will be in Salt Lake 
soon and I will appreciate it if you take this matter 
up with him and get it straightened out so that I can 
convey to Samuels whatever belongs to him that is 
included in the property held by me. 
((Under Lawrence instructions I gave Mr. Samuels 
a letter stating that I would do so and consequent! y 
I am anxious to have this matter cleared up." 
c (Kind personal regards, I remain 
Yours very truly, 
A. E. Upton." 
On cross examination Mr. Upton testified as to the 
Samuels interest as follows: 
HQ. Now you have 'used the expression, (Execute'-do 
you mean by that, that you would give Samuels 
a deed? 
13 
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nA. I meant I would quit claim to him any claim that 
I might have under my record holdings~ 
ceQ. Let us get that clear. You would give Samuels 
a quit claim deed to his interest in the property 
whenever he got an order from Heiselt to do so? 
nA. Yes, that is what I said to Mr. Samuels, yes." 
· After the bank account was opened (Exhibit 9) extensive 
construction work was carried on in the name of Heiselt Con-
struction Company (Tr. 330, 337). Upton and Peterson went 
over the various jobs, met with the men, collected on the esti--
mates, deposited money in the bank and issued checks signed 
by Heiselt Construction Company by A. E. Upton. (See Ex-
hibit 35, consisting of a pack of checks issued by Upton for 
the Heiselt Construction Company). See also testimony of 
Upton with respect to the issuance of checks (Tr. 229, 230). 
No evidence, oral or documentary, was offered showing 
that Upton had given notice at any time that he claimed the 
ownership of the lots adversely to either Heiselt Construction 
Company of L. H. Heiselt or V. M. Samuels. On cross-exami-
nation, Upton said that he made up his mind to take the 
property from Samuels when he brought the foreclosure suit, 
(Tr. 221) but there is no evidence that he communicated his 
state of mind to Samuels or that he had ever refused to do 
what he said he would do in the letter. 
Evidence was offered to the effect that William J. Christ-
ensen, who for many years had been employed by Heiselt and 
who was paying him money as late as 1942 to represent him, 
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was in charge of the lots, and he had put a man in possession 
of an old house, had authorized him to make improvements 
to the house and to offset them against accruing rent. There 
is also evidence that Upton, shortly prior to May 6, 1946, made 
a contract to sell all this property to Mark B. Garff. Garff was 
given notice of the claim of the Heiselt Construction Company 
and took the property subject to the title· being cleared in Upton. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANTS 
- ~ INTEND TO RELY FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE 
JUDGMENT MADE AND GIVEN HEREIN. 
I 
The court committed error in sustaining objections to the 
testimony of the witness, Heiselt, respecting the employment 
of William J. Christensen in 1941 and 1942 (Tr. 217-221). 
II 
The court committed error in striking Exhibit 17 from 
the record and in sustaining objections to Exhibits 3 7, 38 and 
20. 
III 
The real estate described in the Complaint was acquired 
by purchase of L. H. Heiselt and the plaintiff A. E. Upton, 
subject to the inteersts of V. M. Samuels, paid for in part with 
checks upon the account of Heiselt Construction Company, 
and as to all of them, Upton was a tenant in common. 
IV 
The payment of taxes by Upton was a payment for the 
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,benefit of his co-tenants and by such payments, he acquired 
no title adverse to that of his co-tenants, L. H. Heiselt, V. M. 
Samuels and Heiselt Construction Company. 
v 
The $1225.00 advanced by Upton for the payment of 
taxes was a loan to L. H. Heiselt, and the title, if any, ac-
quired by or through the tax deeds, was held as security for 
the payment of the money and not otherwise and constituted 
a mortgage subject to the Option Agreement. 
VI 
Whatever interest Heiselt had in the property, the pay-
ment of the purchase price under the Option and specifically 
the interest acquired by payment of $1750.00 on the purchase 
price by the Referee in Bankruptcy was protected by Section 
75 of the Bankruptcy Act as against tax sales or adverse 
possesston. 
VII 
There is no proof that Upton ever claimed the property 
adversely to Heiselt, the Heiselt Construction Company or 
the Samuels interest. 
VIII 
There is no proof that Salt Lake County acquired any 
title to the property or that it conveyed any title by the Quit-
Claim Deeds. The tax deeds are void. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The plaintiff, as a part of his proof, attempted to show 
by the witness Watson that he had occupied a building upon 
one of the lots described in the Complaint. The witness testi-
fied (Tr. 173) that Mr. Upton and Mr. Christensen rented 
him the property. Upon cross examination, he testified that 
he had never talked to Mr. Upton about it; that his dealings 
were all with Mr. Christensen (Tr. 178). 
In answer to a question as to when he first employed 
Christensen, Upton replied: 
etA. The foreclosure and the trust deed suit, to my 
best recollection, that is the first time I en1ployed. 
Mr. Christensen.'' 
With the witness Heiselt on the stand, the defendants offered 
to show that Christensen was employed in the construction 
work which the parties were doing and further, that his em-
ployment by Heiselt continued through 1941 and 1942, that 
he was employed to move rails from the ground in contro-
versy; that he was employed to bring a suit by Heiselt in 1941 
and 1942 and that he was paid money by Heiselt during the 
period from 1939 to 1942. All such testimony was rejected. 
(See also Exhibit 27). 
While testimony of adverse poss~ssion 1n vtew of Mr. 
Upton's testimony that he first employed Christensen in 1943, 
is ·very weak, still testimony by Heiselt to meet the inferences 
from the statements made that Christensen was ·working for 
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him during that period upon this particular ground, and in 
other matters, and was receiving money from him in 1941 
and 1942 was material and proper and should have been 
received in evidence. The court erred 1n rejecting it. (Tr. 
379, 383). 
Point II 
From the statement of facts, the court will have observed 
that the' plaintiff, the defendant L. H. Heiselt and E. H. 
Peterson deposited money in the National City Bank, of which 
the plaintiff was president and against which the plaintiff 
drew numerous checks for large sums, and against which 
Peterson drew one or more checks and against which, checks 
for the payment of the property covered by the Option Agree-
ment (Exhibit 1) had been drawn and paid. No settlement 
among the parties was made. Peterson withdrew from the 
arrangement (Tr. 360) leaving only the plaintiff and the 
defendant Heiselt. The Option Agreement (Exhibit 3) pro-
vided for the payment of taxes, and the plaintiff issued his 
personal check for the taxes amounting to the sum of $1225.00. 
On April 17, 1946, Heiselt went to Denver for the pur-
pose of making settlement. Relating a conversation with the 
plaintiff, he said: 
(]told him I wanted to get this land fixed up and the 
title cleared and that I wanted to get the deeds so I 
had a clep.r title to it.'' 
and he said: 
ni will clear up the title for you and give you a re-
lease of these tax deeds which I hold for $6,000.00." 
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The conversation continued for sometime that day and was 
taken up on the following day (Tr. 358, 362). As a result 
of these conversations, the parties agreed upon $4500.00 as 
the amount to be paid and then agreed upon the terms of pay-
ment of this amount (Tr. ·358, 362). They went to the office 
of E. B. Upton (Tr. 362) where the following conversation 
occurred: 
HI said to Mr. A. E. Upton, will you tell E. B. about 
our settlement?' so he said, That is A. E. Upton said 
to E. B. Upton, (Lawrence and I have come to a settle-
ment on this yard property over here that I hold these 
tax deeds on for $122 5.00 and also on this tax sale in 
'41.' " 
The terms of the settlement were noted and later, during the 
day, the plaintiff wrote a letter to William J. Christensen, his 
representative in Salt Lake, in which he said: 
(tLawrence has been here a couple of days nego-
tiating with me, and we have come to an understanding 
if the matter can be worked out. He will take it up 
with you upon his return to Salt Lake." (Exhibit 17). 
Later in the day he wrote another letter, in which he stated: 
tel neglected to tell you in my first letter today to 
cooperate with Ben Roberts . . . . . in order that we 
may get the settlement contract completed." (Exhibit 
38). . 
and at the meeting in the office of E. B. Upton, E. B. Upton 
wrote out the terms of the settlement in the presence of A.E. 
Upton (Exhibit 3 7). These instruments were offered in evi-
dence. (Exhibit 17 was received) Thereafter, (Tr. 464, 465) 
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objection was sustained to Exhibit 38, the second letter (Exhibit 
3 7) , the statement of the settlement and Exhibit 17 was 
stricken. 
These documents were offered for the purpose of showing 
that on April 18, 1946, the plaintiff did not claim ownership 
of the land but claimed only a lien upon it for the repayment 
to him of the money he had advanced for the payment of the 
taxes. There was nothing said by either of the parties to 
the effect that there was an offer of compromise or that either 
of the parties was surrendering any interest in the property 
claimed by him. 
The exhibits were clearly admissible. The court erred, 
,and the error was prejudicial (Tr. 372). 
Heiselt and Upton went to the Referee 1n Bankruptcy 
and asked him for an opinion as to the bankruptcy proceeding. 
The opinion was written and was offered in evidence as Ex-
hibit 20. It shows the proceeding was pending from October 
20, 1940. Upton knew from this that Heiselt's interest was 
protected. We think the court erred in rejecting Exhibit 20. 
Points III, IV 
TENANTS IN COMMON OR PARTNERS 
It is necessary to advert to the evidence to determine 
whether the relationship in the acquisition of the land de-
scribed in tha Complaint was that of partners, tenants in com-
mon, principal and agent, mortgagor and mortgagee, or 
trustee and beneficiary, or as to whether, at one period or 
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another, throughout the tangled transactions leading up to 
this litigation all of those relationships existed. 
We will, in the first instance, direct the court's attention 
to the oral and documentary evidence upon which the deter-
mination of this relationship must be made. Heiselt and 
Upton were friends of longstanding( Tr. 235). Prior business 
relationships had been friendly and satisfactory. Heiselt had 
contracts with the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company 
calling for heavy construction work. Whether Upton expected 
to realize upon thees contracts by cooperating with Heiselt 
and in furnishing the money is a question to be answered 
by· reference to what Heiselt said and what Upton did. The 
first act was to loan Heiselt personally, $1,000.00 on May 4, 
1936, (Exhibit 9) without collateral security. Upton did not 
loan his own money. He loaned the bank's money and it was 
deposited to Heiselt' s account (Exhibit 9). An understanding 
was had between them that Upton and Peterson would also 
deposit money in that account. 
Accordingly on May 11th, Upton deposited $1,000.00 
in the account and on May 18th, Peterson did likewise. Peter-
son also made two deposits of $500.00 each and a deposit of 
$200.00 on May 26th, June 1st and June 6th. 
On June 9th, Heiselt gave his note to the bank for 
$5,000.00 and was given credit for that amount. ·On July 
6th, he gave his note for $3,000.00 to the bank and was 
credite4 with that amount. On July 13th, he gave another 
note to the bank for $3,000.00 and was credited with that 
amount. It is unnecessary to pursue the deposits further for 
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the purpos·e ·of characterizing the account. _ All the money 
that had gone into the account thus far had been, by way 
of advancements by Upton and Peterson and for notes of 
.Heiselt without collateral security. · 
Immediately af~er the first deposit on May 4th, Heiselt 
and Upton came to Salt Lake and negotiated for the purchase 
of the lots and for the purchase of heavy equipment for the 
doing of the Rio Grande work. 
On May 8th, 1936, after negotiations between Heiselt 
and Upton and L. R. Wattis, an Option Agreement was made 
(Exhibit 3). The Option was for the sale to L. H. Heiselt 
and A. E. Upton of the lots 
((Together with all equipment, plans, supplies, camp 
outfits, etc., and an equity in a California ranch." 
all of which property was to be free and clear of any liens 
or encumbrances, 
H ••• except unpaid taxes and the trustee claim of 
the Plumas County Bank of Quincy, California, against 
the J. Evans Ranch." 
Immediately after this Option, Heiselt gave Ben E. Roberts 
a check for $300.00 as compensation for loading equipment 
out of the yards and arranging to have the taxes cleaned up 
(Tr. 322). And Upton and Heiselt went on to Nevada and 
California. Upton took charge of the loading of the equip-
ment for shipment to the jobs in Colorado. 
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Heiselt said this was pursuant to an arrangement which 
he stated as follows: 
HA .... I said, 'Well, I am willing to do it (the rail-
road \York) with the three of us and the Heiselt 
Construction Company can take the work and rent 
the equipment, and we will do the work .as indi-
viduals.' 
So then we talked it over; and I was to be, or 
the Heiselt Construction Company was to be al-
lowed a reasonable rental. The price was never'"' 
set as to how much for a shovel or a truck, but a 
reasonable rental, and I was to receive a reasonable 
salary for over-seeing the jobs, and they were to 
finance me and furnish the bond. Mr. Petersen, he 
\vent down, and I think Mr. Upton went once, and 
we talked to Mr. Jacobs, of the Fidelity Guarantee." 
* * * * * * * 
A. I signed the bond as Heiselt Construction Com-
pany, and Petersen went surety on the bond, then 
we agreed that Upton and I would go ... " (Tr. 
312). 
After these preliminary arrangements the work for the 
railroad company began, and in performance of this work, 
Upton took a very active part. He went over the jobs, issued 
checks in payment of the labor, supplies, etc., and did precisely 
what the arrangement, as stated by Heiselt, contemplated. He 
furnished the money or the credit and received no security. 
He wrote the telegram (Exhibit 18) accepting the Option 
to buy. He 0. K.'d and mailed to the seller of the land $100.00 
as a first payment on the Option (Exhibit 15), also a check 
(the second check ( (Exhibit 16). See also letter (Exhibit 
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2). He signed ~ check for $1,000.00, ccThe Heiselt Construc-
tion Company by L. H. Heiselt by A. E. U." Exhibit 33), and 
mailed that check to the sellers (Exhibit 2). These checks 
were paid out of the account made up by the deposits of 
Heiselt, Peterson and Upton. 
The receipts upon the estimates for work done were later 
deposited to the same account. One of the deposits was 
$13,230.00. We call the court's attention specifically to Ex-
hibit 35. The check with the exhibit number is for $11,130.00 
and is payable to the bank signed by Heiselt Construction Com-
pany by A. E. Upton. 
Up to this point, the loose partnership agreement, as 
stated by Heiselt _and categorically denied by Upton was run-
ning true to form and up to that time, Peterson was taking an 
active interest in the business to the extent that he had signed 
the bond, evidently furnished supplies, and he drew at least 
one check on the account (Exhibit 13) for $1050.qo without 
having given the bank a signature card or having provided 
necessary authority for drawing on the account. Thus far, 
we conclude this business was done under the partnership 
agreement. At all events it was a trust relationship. 
At the time the option was given, it was recognized by 
all the parties that V. _M. Samuels had an interest in the 
property. The option reads: 
nExcept the interest formerly owned by the Wattis-
Samuels Company and transferred to V. M. Samuels." 
In the abstract (Exhibit 32) is a deed from Sophia Ohlin and 
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husband to L. R. W attis, Heiselt Construction Company and 
Wattis-Samuels Company, a corporation (Entry 58). Entry 
59 is a deed from Wattis-Samuels Company to V. M. Samuels. 
The first deed covers Lot 36, Block 2. The second deed covers 
an undivided one-fourth interest in Lots 1 to 7, 2 5 to 3 5, and 
an undivided one-third of Lot 36. The abstract does not show 
a deed to the Wattis-Samuels Company of any of the property 
except Lot 36. Samuels conveyed to Heiselt and Heiselt Con-
struction Company by deed (Exhibit 30) which was received 
in evidence. Exhibits 29 and 31 covered the remaining lots, 
and they were rejected (Tr. 227). In the letter from plaintiff 
to Ben E. Roberts (Exhibit 8) he states the interests of Samuels 
covered by the Option as follows: 
CtMr. Heiselt settled with Mr. V. M. Samuels today 
for the amount owing him, namely $800.00, on the 
P and H Model 205 shovel. Mr. Samuels has con-
veyed the shovel to me and Mr. Heiselt sells to Mr. 
Samuels fifteen tons of steel rail from his Salt Lake' 
yard and I am to convey to Mr. Samuels one-third in-
terest in Lot 36, Block 2, Maa·ck Addition and a one-
fourth interest in Lots 1 to 7, and 25 to 35, inclusive, 
in Block 2, Maack Addition. The intent being to con-
vey to Mr. Samuels the interest that he already owned 
as referred to in the original agreement between L. R. 
W attis and L. H. Heiselt." 
Plaintiff testified as follows: 
((Q. When you bought these tax titles with the check 
you sent to Ben Roberts, for $1,225, did you 
intend to acquire those tax titles adversely to 
Heiselt, and to take the property from Heiselt 
with that check? 
A. No. 
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Q. _When did you first decide that you would rely upon 
these tax titles and take whatever interest Mr. 
Heiselt had in the property away from him? 
A. At the time-let me see-this way away back-
what is the date of that check, Mr. Skeen, that 
$1,225 check? 
Q. Exhibit 5, Mr. Upton, is dated December 19, 1936. 
THE COURT: Dated what? 
MR. SKEEN: December 19, 1936, and transmitted by 
Alder & Upton. 
A. May I ask Mr. Heiselt a question? 
Q. No, you are on the witness stand now." 
And then follows his statement that he intended it as a loan. 
And again, with reference to the interest in the property held 
by Samuels, he testified: ( T r. 219) 
nQ. Mr. Upton, you had bought the tax title or had 
put up the $1,225 sometime before this, hadn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had no intention, at that time, of taking fron1 
Mr. Samuels any interest he had in that property, 
did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you now? 
A. No. 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. So, whatever Mr. Samuels' interest is, you are will-
ing to give it to him, are you ? 
A. I certainly am not. 
* * * * * * * * 
Q. When did you change your mind and decide to 
keep the property for yourself-when you brought 
this suit? 
A. Why, yes, when I started the foreclosure suit. That 
is the time I carried the property through-all these 
years-and paid the taxes and gave Mr. Heiselt 
an opportunity to clear it up." 
The foreclosure suit referred to was filed July 9, 1943. 
There was no adverse claim as to Samuels. 
POINT V 
We have called the court's attention to the fact that 
Roberts was paid on May 8, 1936, the sum of $300.00 for 
services, part of which cov~red the matter of procuring an 
adjustment of taxes upon the property which were ~xcepted 
by the Option. 
After Roberts had procured an Agreement with Salt Lake 
County for the settlement of the taxes (Exhibit 40) dated 
December 14, 1936, something had to be done to provide 
money with which to make the payment. Accordingly, after 
conferences between Upton and Heiselt, Upton agreed to ad-
vance the money to pay the taxes. , He drew his check for 
$1225.00 and they went to the office of his attorney, Ernest 
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B. Upton, a brother. Heiselt relates what occurred there and 
circumstances under which the $1225.00 was advanced to pay 
the taxes as follows: (Tr. 324) 
CCA. I said to Mr. Upton that Mr. Roberts had notified 
me that the County Commissioners would settle the 
taxes for $1,225.00. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. (Continued) And that they would have to be paid 
before-or this settlement would have to be made 
before December 21st, I believe. I told Mr. Upton 
that he had made a good profit on the Christensen 
livestock deal, that I had cut him in on-namely, 
$4,000.00. * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * 
A. (Continued) And I asked him if he could not put 
up or let me have $1,225.00 to send to Roberts 
to pay the tax levy. He said he would. * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * 
A. We went down, to E. B. Upton's office. 
That A. E. Upton told E. B. Upton: 
UA. That he was going to send a $1,225.00 check, a 
personal check, to Ben E. Roberts, to clean up the 
taxes on the land that we had just taken an option 
for. 
Q. Was anything else said? 
A. Mr. Upton- ; · 
1.! ... - •• -.• 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Which Upton? 
A. Mr. A. E. Upton told E. B. Upton to write a letter 
to Ben E. Roberts and tell him what to do with this 
z $1,225.00 check and that I told him that he could 
have the tax deeds made to him, and he could hold 
them until we got our partnership affair straighten-
ed out.'' 
The letter was written and with the check for $1,225.00 trans-
!mitted to Ben E. Roberts for use and payment of the taxes. 
The letter of transmittal reads: (Exhibit 5) : 
* * * * * * * * 
(tWe herewith enclose check of A. E. Upton on The 
National City Bank of Denver payable to County 
Treasurer of Salt Lake County, Utah, for $1,225.00, 
with instructions from Mr. Heiselt and Mr. Upton 
that it is to be used to secure tax deeds on certain prop-
erties known as W attis and Heiselt Storage Yards, 
about which property you have had correspondence, 
in the name of A. E. Upton." 
Mr. Upton clearly characterizes this advancement as a loan. 
He says: (Tr. 250) 
~(A. . .. Mr. Heiselt asked me to redeem this stuff and 
save the property and advance the property, and 
I told him I would do it. He said he would pay 
me just what it would cost through the Tax De-
partment. I said: (You can forget that, I don't 
want any highway earnings from you, and when 
you pay me back you can pay me on the basis of 
the rate we are charging you for money, and I 
wil be perfectly satisfied.' " 
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and further, he testified: 
ttA. . . . I am assuming that Mr. I-Ieiselt was trying 
to buy those taxes in, to get at my $1,225.00; and 
right then and there I had stood on the record of 
adverse possesion of property, and whatever the 
records of this City and County show regarding 
those properties, and I am going to continue on 
that to the end." 
The court must conclude that the $1,225.00 was a loan 
and Upton took the tax deeds to secure its repayment. 
; There is no evidence in the record of any attempt to fore-
close the lien if any he acquired upon the property by reason 
of this advancement. The record shows the contrary. He 
made no statement of account to Heiselt. He made no demand 
for repayment of taxes and on April 18, 1946, he and Heiselt 
had a complete settlement as to the amount payable by Heiselt. 
We have called the court's attention to Exhibits 17, 3 7 and 
38. These instruments ·show, without question, that the ad-
vancement of $1,225.00 was then treated by the parties as 
a loan, and it was necessary only to compute the interest upon 
the $1,225.00 as stated in the testimony quoted, and add the 
subsequent taxes paid by Upton to close the transaction. Ex-
hibits 17, 3 7 and 38 should have been received in evidence. 
They are controlling. 
As to trusts and other fiduciary relations, the law in this 
state is settled. 
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Thomas vs. Glendenning, 13 Utah 47. 
McCready vs. Fredrickson, 41 Utah 388. 
In this case Judge Frick reviews the authorities at length as 
to tenants in common. 
In Sperry vs. Tolley, 199 P. 2d 542, 
the court settles the law as to payment of taxes by a tenant in 
common. The rule laid down is applicable to all fiduciary 
relations. 
The Utah statutes control. 
104-5 7-7 provides: 
CCA mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a 
conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the 
owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the 
real property without a foreclosure and sale." 
and section 104-5 5-1 provides: 
((There can be but one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mort-
gage upon real estate or personal property, which 
action must be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter.'' 
In Caro v. Wollenberg, Oregon, 136 Pac. 866, 
the court said: 
H t Once a mortgage, always a mortgage,' is an 
ancient equity maxim of approved policy and wisdom, 
the effect of which is to protect borrowers from being 
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forced by their necessities into unequal and cruel bar-
. '' ga1ns. 
((As long as the relation of mortgagor and mort-
gagee existed between Caro and Wollenberg, the 
statute did not commence to run in favor of either of 
them. That relation must be terminated in some way 
before either party in possession can interpose the 
statute as a defense against the other." . . . 
((The right to redeem is favored by a court of equity, 
and will not be allowed to be taken away except upon 
a strict compliance with the steps necessary to divest 
it." . . . 
uThe doctrine of common law, as approved and 
modified by the principles of the civil law, was that an 
equity of redemption could not be cut off except by a 
foreclosure, and that is the general rule in this country 
today, in the absence of any statute controlling." 
And after quoting the statute, the court continued: 
(CA lien upon real or personal property, other than 
that of a judgment or decree, whether it be created 
by mortgage or otherwise, shall be foreclosed, and the 
property be adjudged to be sold to satisfy the debt, 
and this remedy is exclusive, and all other methods 
must be disregarded." 
See Ham vs. Flowers, 214 SC 212, 551 SE 2d 753, 7 ALR 
2d 1124 
and monographic note. 
Th~s case covers mortgagor and mortgagee, tenants, tax 
titles and other fiduciary relations. 
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onHowever, where a mortgagee enters with the permis-
sion, either express or implied, of the mortgagor, he 
occupies the premises in the quasi character of trustee 
for the mortgagor and cannot hold adversely to his 
rights until he distinctly disavows and repudiates his 
mortgagee relationship and notice thereof is brought 
home to the mortgagor. Becker v. McCrea, 193 NY 
423, 86 NE 463, 23 LRA NS 754. It was held on the 
first appeal in Frady et al. vs. Invester, 118 SC 195, 
110 SE 135, 1938, that where the mortgagee's entry 
\Vas permisive, ~she could not hold adversely to the 
rights of the mortgagors until she either surrendered 
possession or gave notice of an adverse possession.' 
In Bradley vs. Calhoun, 125 SC 70, 117 SE 811, 815, 
the Court said: ~The principle is just and well-estab-
lished that, where one's possession was begun in 
privity with or in subservience to the title of .another, 
a quasi fiduciary relation is established, and, before 
a foundation can be laid for the operations of the 
statute of limitations or the defense of adverse posses-
sion by the acquisition of an outstanding title, a clear, 
positive, and continued disclaimer of the title under 
which he enetred and the assertion of an adverse claim 
must be brought home to the other party. Until the 
trust is openly repudiated, the cesti que trust may rely 
upon the integrity of the trustee without endangering 
his right by lapse of time.' " 
The note fully covers all questions involving the relation 
of mortgagor and mortgagee as it may be affected by possession, 
payment of taxes and purchase of tax titles. 
POINT VI 
The plaintiff introduced Exhibit J, a petition filed by Law-
rence Hensen Heiselt for relief under Section 75 of the Bank-
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ruptcy act. It was filed on the 21st day of October, 1940. 
The filing of this petition under the terms of the Federal 
Statute conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property 
of the debtor wherever located upon the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado. Sub-Section teO" of Section 
75 reads as follows: 
ct ( o) Except upon petition made to and granted by the 
judge after hearing and report by the conciliation com-
missioner, the following proceedings shall not be in-
stituted, or if instituted at any time prior to the filing 
of a petition under this section, shall not be maintained, 
in any court or otherwise, against the farmer or his 
property, at any time after the filing of the petition 
under this section, and prior to the confirmation or 
other disposition of the composition or extension pro-
posal by the court: 
* * * * * * * * 
( 3) Proceedings to acquire title to land by virtue of 
any tax sale;" 
While i tis not necessary to show notice of the pendency 
of the proceeding, the plaintiff did in fact have notice and the 
proceeding was pending at the time of the issuance of the 
tax deeds in 1941. It was pending as late as 1948. (See Ex-
hibit J). Heiselt and Upton we!}t to the Referee and asked 
for an opinion of the Referee as late as May 1, 1947, with 
respect to 'the sale by Upton. of the property. The Referee 
· addressed a letter to Mr. Upton (Exhibit 20) quoting Section 
( o) of Section 75. Upton disregarded the proceeding and 
the opinion of the Referee and attempted to sell the property 
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in disregard of the interests of Heiselt and Heiselt Construc-
tion Company and Samuels. Furthermore, he did this de-
liberately after the Referee paid to Wattis $1,7500.00 out 
of the funds of Heiselt under his contract to complete the pur-
chase of the property, a condition precedent to the acquisition 
of the property by Upton. 
Common honesty as between man and man forbade Upton 
from acquiring this property hostile to that of the W attis in-
terest. His mortgage was subordinate to the purchase price. 
He had participated in the exercise of the option to purchase 
the property and participated in the purchase to the extent of 
the payment of all of the money up to the last $1, 750.00. After 
he changed his mind, he attempted to acquire the interest ad-
verse not only to Heiselt and Samuels but to W attis and the 
Referee. It is not necessary to stand entirely upon the absolute 
prohibitive provisions of the Federal la ~ as above quoted and 
as often construed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
for the situation in which Upton placed himself prevented him 
in equity from acquiring this interest. For construction of this 
statute see 
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 84 L. Ed. 3 77 
In this case, the court said: 
UThe mortgagees who sought to enforce the mort-
gage after the petition was duly filed in the bankruptcy 
court, the Walworth County Court that attempted to-
grant the mortgagees relief, and the sheriff who en-
forced the court's judgment, were all acting in viola-
tion of the controlling Act of Congress. Because that 
State court had been deprived of all jurisdiction or 
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power to proceed with the foreclosure, the confirmatio~ 
of the sale the execution of the sheriff's deed, the wnt 
' of assistance, and the ejection of appellants from their 
property-to the extent based upon the court's action 
-were all without authority of law." 
While this foreclosure has reference to a mortgage by 
the express terms of the statute the prohibition applies like-
wise to the issuance of tax deeds. 
POINT VII 
By the statement of the evidence and quotations of testi-
mony under Points III and IV, we have shown that the plain-
tiff consi~tently recognized the interests of Heiselt, the Heiselt 
Construction Company and Samuels in and to all of the prop-
erty. We can only add in support of this point negatively 
that there is no evidence whatsoever in the case that Upton, 
at any time, entertained the idea of claiming this property 
adversely prior to 1943 and no evidence that he ever, at any 
time, notified the joint owners of the property or the mort-
gagors, as the case may be, of his intention to hold it adversely. 
On the contrary, as late as 1946 as shown by Exhibits 17, 37 
and 38, he recognized the claims of the others and at that 
time, entered into an agreement for the repayment to him of 
the money he loaned to pay the taxes and agreed_ to clear the 
title in these defndants upon paymnt of the amount due him 
on the loans. 
POINT VIII 
TAX DEEDS 
The Appellee's First Cause of Action alleges that he is 
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the owner and holder of certain tax deeds, copies of which 
are attached to the Complaint, marked Exhibits A through G; 
that the period of redemption from the tax sale upon which 
said deeds 'vere issued has expired; that all general property 
.. taxes and assessments have been properly assessed and appellee 
paid all taxes, assessments, redemption fees, interest and penal-
ties for the year 1930 to date of Complaint (Tr. 1 and 2). Ap-
pellant generally demurred to the Complaint (Tr. 26). The 
general Demurrer should have been sustained insofar as Count 
One is concerned for the reason that Appellee alleged owner-
ship in himself by specific averment that his title was a tax 
title. The appellee did not allege the essential ~teps to divest 
the o-wner of title. 
Tree vs. White, 171 Pac. 2d 398 (Utah 1946) 
In the Tree case, the court cited many authorities to sup-
port its position, and in particular 
Bean vs. Fairbanks, 46 Utah 513, 151 Pac. 338, 340: 
((The defendants could have averred ownership in 
general terms, and then to support the allegation, could 
have made proof of _a tax title." 
but that 
tc ••• When a person relies on a tax title and pleads 
ownership founded on tax title, ~e must show by. his 
pleadings that every essential step tn the tax proceedtngs 
to divest the owner of title has been conducted accord-
ing to law." 
The appellee nowhere alleges that the proceedings coe-
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nected with the assesment, valuation, notice, equalization, 
levies, tax notices, advertisement and sale, May sale, Auditor's 
deed, etc., were made, but rather, generally alleges that all 
taxes and assessments have been properly assessed. 
Appellee in Count One alleged ownership by virtue of a 
tax title (Tr. 1 and 2). Appellant answering denied that 
the tax sales of the property were valid sales and that the pro-
ceedings upon which the tax deeds were issued were valid pro-
ceedings (Tr. 31). It was stipulated at the pretrial (Tr. 
121) as follows: 
nit is stipulated that plaintiff's Exhibits A, .B. C. D, 
E, F, and G which are attached to the plaintiff's com-
plaint may be admitted in evidence by ·the plaintiff. 
The defendants represented, however, do not admit 
the legal effect of said exhibits and do not admit that 
the plaintiff obtained title therefrom except as trustee.'' 
After the pretrial, defendant filed Amendment and Sup-
plement to separate Answers in which he alleged as follows 
(Tr. 125): 
(CAdmit the execution of deeds by Salt Lake County 
attached to the Complaint as Exhibits CCA" to tcG.'' 
Deny that by said deeds, Salt Lake County transferred 
title to the property described in paragraph 2, First 
Count, to said plaintiff." · 
Only Exhibits A through G and an abstract of title were 
offered by appellee to prove his tax title. 
Under the provisions of 80-10-35, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, and particularly 80-10-68 (7): 
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HA copy of the record of the tax sale and a copy of 
the auditor's endorsement made thereon, duly certi-
fied by the recorder under the seal of his office, shall 
be prima facie evidence in all courts of the conveyance 
to the county in a fee simple of the property therein de-
scribed and of the regularity of all proceedings pre-
liminary thereto." 
A copy of such record is necessary. There was none offered by 
appellee. 
Mercur Coalition Mining Company vs. Cannon, 184 
P. 2d 341 (Utah 1947) 
Justice Wolfe (concurring) said as follows: 
UA party who sets up title by tax deed must show that . 
all requirements of law have been complied with to 
make the tax deed valid. Asper v. Moon, 24 Utah 241, 
67 P. 209; Bolognese v. Anderson, 87 Utah 450, 44 
P. 2d 706, rehearing 87 Utah 455, 49 P. 2d 1034. Sec-
tion 80-10-35, U. C. A. 1943, simplified the proving 
of compliance with the taxing requirements by provid-
ing that a certified copy of the record of any tax sale 
is prima facie evidence of regularity of all proceedings 
connected with the assessment, valuation, and the other 
steps of the proceedings and providing that such a 
certified copy of the record of the tax sale casts the 
burden of showing any irregularity in any of the pro-
ceedings on him who asserts that irregularity~, 
APPELLEE'S TAX TITLE INSOFAR AS BASED UPON 
TAX SALE FOR THE YEAR 1936 IS VOID (Tr. 5, 6, 7) 
According to exhibits at Tr. 10 and 11, the Auditor made 
his deed to Salt Lake County on March 31, 1936 and April 10, 
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1936 respectively. On January 4, 1937, Salt Lake County 
conveyed by deeds to A. E. Upton the property for tax sales 
of the years 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1935. At the 
date of the conveyances, taxes for the year 1936 were then de-
linquent. Under the provisions of 80-10-25, 1933 Revised 
laws of Utah, taxes for 1936 became delinquent on November 
30, 1936. 
80-10-68 (Laws of Utah 19~3, Chapter 62) 
'(Whenever a county has received a tax deed for any 
real estate sold for delinquent taxes, the board of 
county commissioners shall, during the month of May 
in each year . . . offer for sale . . . 
The first bid received in an amount sufficient to pay 
the taxes, penalties, interest and costs, including all 
taxes assessed subsequently to the date of the certificate 
of sale shall be accepted .... 
All property for which there is no purchaser at the 
sale provided for in this section shall thereafter be 
disposed of by the , board of county commissioners at 
any titne thereafter at either public or private sale, for 
such price and upon such terms as the said board may 
determine ... 
All money received upon the sale of property made 
pursuant to the terms of this section shall be paid into 
the county treasury, and the treasurer must settle for 
the same as in the case of money received for redemp-
tion." · 
80-10-59, Laws of Utah 1933, Chapter 61 provides: 
" ... For the purpose of computing the amount re-
quired for redemption and for the purpose of making 
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distribution of the payments received on account hereof, 
all such payments shall be applied in the following 
order: 
First, against the interest accrued upon the delinquent 
tax for the last year included in said delinquent ac-
count at the time of payment; 
Second, against the penalty charged upon the de-
linquent tax for the last year included in the delinquent 
account at the time of payment; 
Third, against the delinquent tax for the last year 
included in the delinquent account at the time of pay-
ment/' 
The county may sell the property when it has not been 
sold at the May sale as provided by law to a third person at 
whatever price may appear to the County Commissioners 
as reasonable. However, upon such sale, the first moneys 
received shall be applied to extinguishment of the last year 
in the delinquent account at the time of payment. When the 
County accepted from the appellee payment on January 4, 
1937 for the taxes when due, taxes for the year 1936 were 
delinquent, and the money so received should have been ap-
plied first to the year 1936; therefore, the tax sales giving 
basis to tax deeds at T r. 5, 6 and 7 were invalid because the 
year 1936 had been paid in full by the payment to the County 
aforesaid. It folows that the deeds themselves (Tr. 5, 6 and 
7) were void ab initio. 
The tax sales for the year 1936 (Tr. 5, 6 and 7) were 
invalid for the further reason that the certificates of sales 
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for the years 1930 and 1931 were held by the county until 
April of 1936 (Tr. 10 and 11) and under the provisions of 
80-10-40 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 the treasurer could 
not sell for taxes while the certificate of sale is held by the 
county. 
Sorensen v. Bills, 261 P. 350, 70 Utah 509 
Reeve v. Blatchley, 147 P. 2d 861 (Utah 1944) 
80-10-32 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 provided for the 
sale to county beginning at noon on December 21 and before 
January 21. Certificates of sale for 1936 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
H, pages 79 and 80) are dated January 11, 1937. 
Bruno v. Madison, 113 P. 1030, 38 Utah 485 
The exact date of the sales does not appear, but, since the 
certificates are dated January 11 must have occurred prior 
thereto, and probably prior to January 4, 1937, the date when 
the county conveyed to Appellee (Tr. 8 and 9). Thus it would 
appear that the county in fact, attempted to convey a tax title 
at a time when there was already another tax sale outstanding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.D. SKEEN, 
SKEEN, BAYLE & RUSSELL, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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